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ALL THE REST MUST BE TRANSLATED:
LÉVINAS’S NOTION OF SENSE
It is generally agreed that Lévinas’s political thought has seriously
weakened the appeal and force of his ethics. In the preface to his
monograph Lévinas and the Political, Howard Caygill mentions such
an event: In a radio broadcast of 1982, after the massacres in an
Israel-occupied area in Lebanon, Lévinas manifested “a coolness of
political judgement that verged on the chilling, an unsentimental
understanding of violence and power almost worthy of Machiavelli.”1
This put him in mind of Lévinas’s saying, “in alterity we can find an
enemy.”2 Caygill felt that that was not the philosopher who has been
widely known as a staunch advocate for the priority of ethical alterity.
The perplexity that arose from such an experience drove him to
reread Lévinas with a view of his political judgment. In one section
entitled “Threatening others” in his book, Caygill deals with the
few texts of Lévinas’s that bear upon the relation with non-Western
cultures.
Caygill does not refer to an article predating his book, that is,
Robert Bernasconi’s article “Who Is My Neighbor? Who Is the
Other?: Questioning ‘the Generosity of Western Thought.’”3 This
article addresses relevant problematics in Lévinas’s notion of the
other and in his claim of the generosity of Western thinking with
regard to understanding other traditions. Another related article is
Sonia Sikka’s “How Not to Read the Other? ‘All the Rest Can Be
Translated.’”4 It accuses Lévinas of subsuming all particular others
into a general notion of the Other.
The most recent article is Andrew McGettigan’s “The Philoso-
pher’s Fear of Alterity: Lévinas, Europe and Humanities ‘without
Sacred History.’”5 While Bernasconi seems to be inclined to differen-
tiate Lévinas’s proper philosophical corpus from his occasional
speeches that convey an appalling message with respect to non-
Western traditions, McGettigan argues for the consistency of Lévi-
nas’s ethics with his biased view of other cultures. For him, Lévinas’s
ethics cannot be accepted as a neutral philosophical construction. It is
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firmly tied to a specific tradition, that is, Judaic heritage as derived
from the “Sacred History.” Caygill holds a similar view as McGetti-
gan’s in observing that Lévinas’s claims with respect to cultural others
are “rigorously consistent with his philosophy,” which “recognizes the
inevitability of war.”6 Other critics of Lévinas include Simon Critch-
ley. Although he has not yet voiced his criticism in writing, in his
opening speech at Hangzhou International Conference on Lévinas
held in September 2006, Critchley stresses in particular that Lévinas’s
thinking manifests a deep-seated ignorance of and prejudice against
non-Western cultures. He also expresses hope that Chinese philoso-
phers pay attention to this problem.
The present article aims to explore Lévinas’s view concerning the
relation between Western tradition and non-Western cultures from
the perspective of his notion of sense as thematized in his article
“Meaning and Sense” published in 1964. The above-mentioned con-
tributions have not yet considered this facet of Lévinas’s thinking
from such a perspective and have hardly dealt with the relevant
article. In “Meaning and Sense,” Lévinas engages in a confrontation
with contemporary French phenomenologists whose thinking shows a
tendency toward a horizontal view of meaning and who celebrate
multiculturalism. Lévinas attempts at reinstating the classical theme
of transcendence through thinking on the alterity of the Other. For
this purpose, he formulates the notion of sense (le sens) as distinct
from meaning (la signification). Sense is absolute and transcendent. It
precedes and makes possible the meaning of all cultures. It provides
unity and orientation by means of which one could make sense of
other cultures. For Lévinas, there is an essential difference between
Western tradition whose scaffold, in his view, consist in Judaic and
Greek heritage, and non-Western traditions wherein is absent the
“Sacred History.” Cultural pluralism necessarily causes chaos and
disorder. Only sense can render non-Western traditions intelligible,
and thus creates unity and order.
I. Sense and Meaning
A Platonic view of meaning has dominated Western philosophical
tradition for thousands of years. According to this view, intellect and
the intelligible belong to two separate realms. The intelligible, that is,
meaning, has its own reality and is independent of the way in which it
is reached. It is prior to and determines language and culture through
which it finds expression. The Platonic soul can rise above concrete
historicality and bodily existence and ascend to the level of meditat-
ing on the idea.
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French phenomenologists, as represented by Merleau-Ponty and
influenced by anthropologists such as Lévi-Strauss, oppose the Pla-
tonic dualistic view of meaning. They stress that there is an intrinsic
correlation between intellect and the intelligible. They belong to each
other. What has been rigorously separated as two unrelated realms
in Platonism are ascribed a quasi-consanguine relation. Language is
regarded as the place where the inseparable connection between
meaning and intellect is originated. The social-political and bodily
existence of human beings is considered to be the precondition for
cognizance and understanding. For these contemporary phenom-
enologists, meaning is not a self-sufficient entity that is external to its
concrete expression. One must acquire meaning on the basis of sen-
sibility and language in which sensibility is embodied.The multiplicity
and variation of culture and history do not form an obstacle for
getting close to meaning and essence. Rather, they provide the
avenues through which alone meaning can be obtained. In the mean
time, historical and cultural factors are absorbed into meaning. The
way in which meaning is acquired is an indispensable component
of it.7
These convictions imply a pluralistic view of Being and meaning.
According to this view, Being is not a monistic Parmenidian self-
identity. There can no longer be a single totality of Being; instead,
there can only be a plurality of beings that resist being subsumed
under a totality. Likewise, there cannot be an ultimate judgment.
Instead, there can only be ad hoc judgments. This does not mean that
French phenomenologists have dispensed with any sense of unity.
They believe that the unity of Being resides in the mutual understand-
ing among human beings and the mutual penetration of different
cultures. The achievement of mutual understanding has nothing to do
with the mediation of a common language that is independent of
relevant cultures and can convey ideal meaning.
To use Merleau-Ponty’s terminology, universality can only be
“lateral” (latéralement). It lies in “being able to penetrate one culture
from another,” just as one learns another language on the basis of
one’s mother tongue.8 One must abandon the idea of a universal
grammar and the notion of ideal meaning based on this idea. One
must also reject the presumption that the progress of civilization is
owing to the purification of immature elements of language and to the
separation of truth and meaning from the particularity of cultures.All
cultures lie on the same plane.Western tradition is also determined by
history and culture. The pluralistic notion of meaning does not entail
a rejection of the idea of Being. Rather, it is precisely through plural-
ity that human beings attain an understanding of the essence and
measure of Being. In order to overcome Platonism, philosophy must
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unite with anthropology, which investigates concrete elements of
cultures.
Lévinas resolutely opposes himself to this pluralistic notion of
Being and multiculturalism as derived from it. In “Meaning and
Sense,” he severely criticizes the view of meaning that restricts
meaning to immanence and thus eliminates the dimension of trans-
cendence. For Lévinas, the turn to culture and history is in essence
a kind of disorientation (désorientation) that is consequent upon
modern atheism. In opposition to this trend of thinking, Lévinas
formulates the idea of sense. Sense is “the primordial event (évene-
ment primordial) in which all the other steps of thought and the whole
historical life of being are situated.”9 Sense carries ethical weight. It is
both unique and has a single direction. It is the most primordial
ethical movement oriented toward the absolute Other.
Lévinas compares sense to Rome in the idiom “All roads lead to
Rome.” Lévinas writes, “What is lacking is the sense of all, the Rome
to which all roads lead, the symphony in which all meanings sing, the
song of songs.”10 It is what is ultimate.The turn from cultural meaning
to sense is a leap away from self toward the Other. It is unrelated to
history in the ordinary sense of the word. For Lévinas, what is absurd
is not the lack of meaning, but the mutual insulation among meaning-
totalities, and the absence of sense that alone can guide meaning. The
absence of sense is the same as the death of God. The crisis of sense
is at the same time the crisis of monotheism. Sense is senseless
without God.
Sense is universal and cannot be impeded by any empirical matters.
On the contrary, the unique and universal sense grants meaning to the
concreteness of the world. The absoluteness of sense resides precisely
in this dissymmetry. Concreteness needs sense for the sake of its
justification. In the mean time, sense out of its surplus is present in the
immanent secular historicality. In this sense, Lévinas states that sense
is not another world behind the world of meaning.11 Therefore, it
could be said that there is an intersection between sense and meaning.
While elaborating on the significance of sense, Lévinas also offers a
unique explanation of meaning. He distinguishes meaning from cul-
tural expression. Meaning is not arbitrary and therefore cannot be
ascribed to cultural expression. Meaning does not belong to culture. It
originates in a dialogue with the Other and thus belongs to the order
of ethics and is prior to culture. It is what enables people to make
judgments on culture. For Lévinas, cultural meaning, which is what is
ultimate to the multiculturalists, is in the last analysis only the leftover
fragments after the unity of ideal meaning is broken up. In spite of this
delineation, it seems that sometimes Lévinas is using the word
“meaning” in two different senses. One is the authentic meaning as
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led and oriented by sense. It is transcendent and possesses inner
necessity. The other is cultural meaning as expounded by the multi-
culturalists. Immanent to culture, it is arbitrary and plural. There is
not, and does not need to be, a unitary ideal meaning.
Lévinas’s notion of sense is integrally connected with his philoso-
phy of the Other (Autrui). According to him, contemporary philoso-
phy attaches importance to analyzing the hermeneutic structure of
society, history, language, and the sediments of culture as embodied in
meaning. However, it lacks the dimension of the Other. Lévinas raises
such an incisive interrogation:
Has a third dimension not been forgotten; the direction toward the
Other who is not only the collaborator and the neighbour of our
cultural work of expression or the client of our artistic production,
but the interlocutor, he to whom expression expresses, for whom
celebration celebrates, both term of an orientation and primary
signification?12
The Other is not only a necessary participant in cultural expression, it
is also the interlocutor with whom expressions converse. Cultural
expression is already in relation with the Other before they become
associated with being. The presence of the Other is the condition of
possibility for cultural expressions. The Other cannot be subsumed
into the totality of what is expressed. It reveals itself behind the
assemblage of being. In essence, the Other is equivalent to sense. It is
what alone initiates meaning into being. Lévinas relates the Other
with face as well. The Other manifests himself in a face. The face in its
nudity is without any cultural ornament and is detached from the
world. “The signifyingness of a face in its abstractness is in the literal
sense of the term extra-ordinary.”13
Lévinas compares the epiphany (épiphanie) of the Other with the
epiphany of sense. The Other is present in the context of meaning as
a whole and finds expression in multifarious cultures and languages.
However, the epiphany of the Other is solely related to sense that is
independent of the meaning available in the world. Epiphany is a
radically different mode from manifestation. In terms of the manifes-
tation of the Other, the Other is somewhat related to the world; in
contrast, in terms of the epiphany of the Other, the Other is without
any context and mediation.The Other “involves a signifyingness of its
own.”14 In the same vein, sense is abstract and absolute. It does not
coalesce into meaning in the ordinary world. In contrast with sense,
cultural meaning belongs to the mundane historical world. In being
revealed in the historical world horizontally (horizontalement), it also
reveals the horizon of the world. The epiphany of sense breaks
through the horizontality of cultural meaning. The epiphany of sense
is at the same time the epiphany of the Other.
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Lévinas distinguishes between the epiphany of sense and the given-
ness of sense. In terms of its epiphany, sense is absolute revelation that
is outside of every order and completely independent of the world.
It is a revelation in the revelation, an opening in the opening.15 In
epiphany, sense necessarily divests itself of any form. At this level,
sense cannot be reduced to meaning as understood by the pluralists. It
is clear that Platonic elements are at work in Lévinas’s notion of
sense. In terms of its givenness, sense is given in a specific culture and
language. At this level, one could say that sense is synonymous with
meaning in the authentic sense. In paying attention to the specificity
of cultures, Lévinas attempts to adjust Platonism’s overemphasis on
abstractness.
Lévinas’s orientation of thinking is closely related to his consider-
ation of non-Western cultures. His notion of sense that is unitary and
transcendent aims at overcoming the pluralistic view of being and
multiculturalism. In the following section I discuss some of his
speeches on non-Western cultures.
II. Afro-Asiatic Civilizations and Western Tradition
Lévinas has never explicitly discussed Afro-Asiatic civilizations and
their relation with Western tradition in his proper philosophical
works. However, in some short articles and interviews, he touches
upon this issue. In “The Russo-Chinese Debate and the Dialectic”
(1960), an article published in Esprit, Lévinas raises such a question:
“In abandoning the West, does not Russia fear to drown itself in an
Asiatic civilization which, it too, is likely to carry on existing behind
the concrete appearance of dialectical resolution?”16 What occa-
sioned Lévinas’s composing this article was the Sino-Soviet conflict
that became public in 1960. He deliberately avoided using the term
“Soviet Union,” a term with a strong political overtone, and instead
uses “Russia,” which conveys a sense of cultural heritage belonging to
Western civilization. Even Marxism originates in the West. In the eye
of Lévinas, in spite of the adoption of Marxism in China, the factors of
Asiatic heritage remain active. Even after the presumed realization
of an equal and universal communist state with no differentiation of
classes, the cultural particularity of Asiatic tradition would still be
retained. He comments on the Asiatic heritage in rather disparaging
terms:
The yellow peril! It is not racial, it is spiritual. It does not involve
inferior values; it involves a radical strangeness, a stranger to the
weight of its past, from where there does not filter any familiar voice
or inflection, a lunar or Martian past.17
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In spite of Lévinas’s immediate disclaimer that his usage of “yellow
peril” is not meant to show racial prejudice, as Caygill rightly
observes, “[i]t is difficult to imagine any circumstances in which the
phrase ‘the yellow peril’ cannot be racist.”18 Caygill also suggests that
the consignment of Asia to the moon or to Mars figuratively strips
Asians of their humanity.19 The phrase “radical strangeness” is reso-
nant with Lévinas’s suggestion elsewhere that the Asiatic is a stranger
to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.20 The long history of Asiatic tradition
lacks genuine significance, because it does not have the dimension of
transcendence. Only the Sacred History constitutes the authentic
history. What can prevent Russia from being drowned in Asiatic civi-
lization is its insoluble bond with Western civilization.
In another short article entitled “Jewish Thought Today,” Lévinas
lists three events in the twentieth century that have exerted decisive
influence upon the development of Jewish thought: first, the rise and
defeat of anti-Semitism and the massacre of one-third of Jews by
National Socialists; second, the revival of Zionism and the foundation
of the State of Israel with Zionism as its political underpinning;21
third, “[t]he arrival on the historical scene of those underdeveloped
Afro-Asiatic masses who are strangers to the Sacred History that
forms the heart of the Judaic-Christian world.”22 To those “underde-
veloped Afro-Asiatic masses,” the Sacred History, Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob have no significance. As Lévinas sees it, the main demands
of Afro-Asiatic people are in terms of material sustenance. While
affirming their right to make these demands, he worries that they
might endanger the authenticity of the State of Israel and marginalize
Jews and Christians.
During an interview, Lévinas observes,
I often say, though it’s a dangerous thing to say publicly, that human-
ity consists of the Bible and the Greeks.All the rest can be translated:
all the rest—all the exotic—is dance.23
How should one understand the saying that all the rest is dance?
During another interview, while reiterating similar claims and supple-
ments that his saying is not meant to be racist, Lévinas provides such
an example: When the African people bury their dead, instead of
crying, they go ahead to dance.At the interviewer’s comment that this
is also a way (albeit weird for Westerners) of expressing sadness of
loss, Lévinas responds, “Yes, certainly, to that extent I am still a phi-
losopher. But it gives the impression of a dancing civilization in which
they cry in another way.”24 In these comments, Lévinas identifies
humanity with the Bible and the Greeks, which alone represent
spiritual seriousness. In contrast, African civilization, as a dancing
civilization, is superficial and frivolous. There is no need to attach
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importance to traditions outside of the Bible and the Greeks. Lévinas
seems to be ignorant of the fact that there is a lot of dancing in
Christian churches, if the congregation is black, in Africa, America,
and Europe.
In treating Judaic and Greek traditions as the core of Western
civilization, Lévinas ascribes absoluteness and universality to these
two traditions, especially the former, which is in fact only one among
other traditions. He states that being a Jew after Auschwitz is not a
particularity but a modality; in this sense, “everyone is a little Jewish,
and if there are men on Mars, one would find some Jews there.”25 On
another occasion, he observes, “every time the Jews are implicated,
something universal is at stake.”26 These utterances seem to assume an
open attitude toward other nationalities; however, they presuppose
the thesis that the particularity of Jews is universality at the same
time. The metaphor of Mars reminds one of Lévinas’s description of
the alien history of Asiatic civilization as a “lunar or Martian past” in
his article “The Russo-Chinese debate and the dialectic.”27 The state-
ment “if there are men on Mars, one would find some Jews there”
means that Western civilization alone, which takes Judaeo-Greek tra-
ditions as the core, can ascribe meaning to other cultures, whereas
other cultures do not possess the power of comprehending and dis-
closing the meaning that their traditions may embody. The notion of
the Sacred History, which constitutes the source of the superiority and
uniqueness of Europe, must be promoted in the contemporary world
situation.
Sikka raises severe criticisms of Lévinas’s privileging of the Jews.
She takes issue with Lévinas’s dedication in Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence, which is to all the victims of anti-Semitism. For her,
the label “anti-Semitism” subsumes all the “hatred of the other man”
under this term and thus obscures the specificity of other forms of
hatred and thus fails to address the suffering of other victims than the
Jews in its specificity. For example, the massacre of Indians at Amrit-
sar by British soldiers cannot simply be called anti-Semitism.28
Lévinas would not find such a contention really challenging. For
him, Judaism forms a special intellectual tradition. Only from Judaism
is derived the idea of the other man. As he writes in a Talmudic
commentary, “In question is the other man, who descends from
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But do not become alarmed.We are not in
the presence of a racist idea here.”29 For Lévinas, that he ascribes
unique significance to Judaism should not be taken to be a partiality,
let alone racism. In acknowledging the particularity of Judaism, he
grants unique universality to it. For this reason, non-Jews can share in
this heritage, and perhaps must do so. What can also be noted is that
the other man, or the Other, in Lévinas’s thinking, is integrally asso-
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ciated with the Judaic tradition. The proper Other in his philosophy is
the Other of height, not of horizon, nor of any ontic difference. While
Lévinas often gives the concrete example of the Other as “the weak,
the poor, ‘the widow and the orphan,’”30 Bernasconi rightly points out
that those “descriptive terms that identify the Other in his or her
needs are not being employed solely descriptively;”31 they are more
than examples.They “evoke a specific tradition and so give a historical
determinacy to the way the issues are presented that cannot be
ignored.”32 In the mean time, Lévinas ascribes a “radical strangeness”
to other cultures.33 As Lévinas writes in Totality and Infinity, “The
alterity of a world refused is not the alterity of the Stranger but that
of the fatherland which welcomes and protects.”34 Other cultures are
the Stranger because they have no sense of the Sacred History and
lack the dimension of transcendence. During a discussion on the
occasion of a conflict between Israel and Palestine, a conversant raises
such a question: “Emmanuel Lévinas, you are the philosopher of the
‘other.’ Isn’t history, isn’t politics the very site of the encounter with
the ‘other,’ and for the Israeli, isn’t the ‘other’ above all the Palestin-
ian?” Lévinas responds:
My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the
neighbour, who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that
sense, if you’re for the other, you’re for the neighbour. But if your
neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can
you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can
find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of
knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust.
There are people who are wrong.35
It is clear that, for Lévinas, the alterity of transcendence is in a com-
pletely different order from the alterity of Strangers, who could be
potential enemies. There is an abysmal distance between these two
kinds of alterity.
III. Sense and Non-Western Cultures
Lévinas’s orientation of thinking is undoubtedly connected with the
spread of other cultures in the Western world. When history enters
into the twentieth century,Western philosophers are confronted with,
in Husserl’s words, “a plethora of works” about Indian philosophy,
Chinese philosophy, and so on, which “are placed on a plane with
Greek philosophy and are taken as merely different historical forms
under one and the same idea of culture.”36
The popularity of non-Western cultures and languages is evident in
Lévinas’s use of a Frenchman’s learning Chinese language as an
example in “Meaning and Sense”:
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For a Frenchman there does exist the possibility of learning Chinese
and passing from one culture into another, without the intermediary
of an Esperanto that would falsify both tongues which it mediated.
Yet what has not been taken into consideration in this case is that
an orientation is needed to have the Frenchman take up learning
Chinese instead of declaring it to be barbarian (that is, bereft of the
real virtues of language) and to prefer speech to war.37
It seems that Lévinas cannot refuse to acknowledge the fact that it is
not impossible for a Frenchman to learn Chinese because this is part
of the reality at his time. However, behind his surface discourse, there
are such presuppositions: First, Chinese language can be declared to
be barbarian. If this is the case, instead of trying to learn it, the
Frenchmen can go to war with the Chinese. Lévinas’s consideration is
obviously unilateral. Bernasconi rightly remarks that Lévinas seems
unaware that the Chinese also learn to speak French.38 Second, what
is primordial is an orientation toward the cultural other. Lévinas takes
advantage of the ambiguity of the French word sens as meaning both
sense and direction. Sense is the source of such an orientation that
makes it possible for a Frenchman to choose to learn this foreign
language in the first place, instead of rejecting it as barbarian. Why
does Lévinas mention war? One is put in mind of his statement “in
alterity we can find an enemy” on the occasion of conflict between the
Israeli and the Palestinian. In formulating the notion of sense and
orientation, Lévinas seems to be looking for a mild way in which the
superiority of Western tradition can conquer other cultures. Lévinas
continues to write:
One reasons as though the equivalence of cultures, the discovery of
their profusion and the recognition of their riches were not them-
selves the effects of an orientation and of an unequivocal sense in
which humanity stands. One reasons as though the multiplicity of
cultures from the beginning sunk its roots in the era of decoloniza-
tion, as though incomprehension, war, and conquest did not derive
just as naturally from the contiguity of multiple expressions of
being—the numerous assemblages or arrangements which it takes on
in the diverse civilizations. One reasons as though peaceful coexist-
ence did not presuppose that in being there is delineated an orien-
tation which gives it a unique sense.39
These remarks contain sharp criticisms of French phenomenologists.
As Lévinas sees it, the richness and variety of cultures are not always,
as cultural pluralists attempt to show, something positive. From it
derives incomprehension, conflict, and conquest as well. Contempo-
rary French phenomenologists have unfortunately forgotten the exist-
ence of these negative aspects that are at work at the initial stage of
the discovery of other cultures.At the root of peaceful coexistence lies
sense and orientation. Such an orientation gives meaning to alien
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cultures. Sense is that by means of which any element from other
cultures can be acknowledged and made sense of, by means of which
such a multiplicity of cultures can be manifested at all. Without sense,
there will be much greater possibility of war and conflict.
Lévinas’s notion of sense provides him with a way of mediating the
relation between Western tradition and other cultures. Sense does not
come from out of nowhere; it originates in Judeo-Greek tradition. As
explicated in the first section of the present article, Lévinas thematizes
sense along the same lines as he does with the Other, who manifests
himself in a face. In distinguishing between the epiphany of sense and
the givenness of sense, he seems to be trying to do justice to the
concreteness of culture and history. The epiphany of sense highlights
its transcendence; the givenness of sense points to the side of con-
creteness. However, Lévinas only takes into consideration the his-
torical concreteness of Western tradition to a limited extent. As
Bernasconi argues, Lévinas deliberately avoids addressing the fact
that “many Western Europeans” consider the Jews “not just a
stranger, but even the archetypical alien,” although Judaism is nor-
mally admitted to be a constitutive component of Western culture.40
Lévinas admits that Platonism is vanquished. However, it is van-
quished by the very means which the idea of universality issued from
Plato provides. During an interview in 1980, when the interviewer
mentions that apart from Judaic and Greek cultures, there are Mon-
golian and Indian cultures, Lévinas remarks,
It is Europe which, alongside of its atrocities, invented the idea of
“de-europeanization”; that is a victory for European generosity. For
me, certainly, the Bible is the model of excellence; but I say that while
knowing nothing of Buddhism.41
Lévinas sings praises for the superiority and generosity of Europe.
Although Western civilization has been acutely disparaged with
respect to its ugly history, the resources of overcoming its sickness can
only come from this civilization itself, because only this civilization
embraces the notion of universality and enjoys the power of interpre-
tation out of generosity. The last remark, which is similar to Lévinas’s
qualification that “this is not racism” in speaking of African culture,
seems to be an attempt to preempt criticism of Euro-centrism or
racism. In a certain sense, such remarks serve as the footnote to the
philosophical corpus of a majority of Western philosophers. They
seem to be saying:That I have not touched upon, let alone considered,
non-Western cultures is due to my ignorance of them. Please do not
regard me as an advocate of Eurocentrism or racism.
From our discussion in this article, it can be seen that Lévinas
ascribes an essential difference between Western tradition and non-
Western cultures. Their difference is not one of degree and surface
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appearance, but of depth and essence. Only in Western civilization can
one find the notion of transcendence and of Sacred History, whereas
Afro-Asiatic civilizations are restrained within immanence and lack
their own means to understand themselves. As McGettigan rightly
observes, the face in Lévinas’s philosophy is “tied to a particular
historico-cultural formation: the ‘culture issued from monotheism.’”42
Lévinas’s line of thought is somewhat similar to Heidegger’s with
respect to the origin and status of philosophy. For Heidegger, philoso-
phy is Greek in its origin and nature; the expression “Western-
European philosophy” is a tautology.43 Philosophy is something
particular and universal at the same time. The role of philosophy in
Heidegger is analogous to that of the Sacred History in Lévinas.
However, Heidegger differs from Lévinas in that he does not pro-
pound the idea that people from other traditions can share in phi-
losophy. The reason behind this is probably that, if this would be the
case, then philosophy would lose its uniqueness. Nevertheless,
Heidegger does not deny the possibility that there could be a genuine
East–West dialogue after Western philosophical tradition has accom-
plished its self-transformation.44
Lévinas’s formulation of the notion of sense represents a response
to pluralistic approaches to meaning. To him, cultural pluralism will
necessarily bring about chaos. Only sense as he propounds it can
provide an orientation to understanding and evaluating various cul-
tures. Only Western civilization is able to understand other cultures
“that never understood themselves.”45 For Lévinas, not only “all the
rest can be translated,”46 but also “all the rest must be translated.”This
is because only in this way can there be a unity of intelligibility in the
world, and can transcendence be safeguarded. Translating other cul-
tures with sense as the guide is an effective way to avoid, if at all
possible, unnecessary wars and conflicts. It could be said that Heideg-
ger gives non-Western cultures serious thought even though he did
not really find a place for them in his scheme of thinking. Insofar as
Lévinas gives traditions “without Sacred History” any thought, his
solution is to “generously” provide them with meaning within and by
the Sacred Tradition.
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